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UNITED STATES v. SCOTT: SIXTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTRUSIONS INTO THE
COUNCILS OF THE PRO SE DEFENDANT
In United States v. Scott,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the sixth amendment does not prohibit intentional intrusions by the
government into the strategy conferences between a pro se defendant2
and his lay advisers, unless the defendant can show that he was actually
prejudiced by such intrusions. James Walter Scott, a self-styled "national
tax resistance leader," was convicted after a jury trial of failure to file
federal income tax returns over a four-year period.3 Representing him-
self at trial, Scott was assisted in preparing his defense by a group of his
fellow "tax resisters." This group met with Scott every day after trial to
plan defense strategy. In addition, three of Scott's closest supporters
participated extensively in various out-of-court hearings and confer-
ences, and sat at the counsel table with Scott throughout the trial.4 While
these three individuals were not allowed to make objections or com-
ments during the taking of testimony, 5 Scott frequently consulted with
them in the presence of the jury. Thus, they played a particularly active
role in Scott's overall defense effort.
After the trial had concluded, Scott learned that an undercover
agent of the Internal Revenue Service had been among those attending
his daily defense strategy sessions. Scott therefore moved that his convic-
tion be set aside and a new trial ordered. In support of this motion, Scott
submitted affidavits which asserted that the agent had regularly advised
Scott on trial strategy, urging him at one point to take the stand in his
own defense, and which also suggested that the agent had stolen certain
defense papers." Apparently unimpressed by these allegations, however,
1. 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. A pro se defendant is one who represents himself instead of being represented by
an attorney. See Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
3. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1968), such failure constitutes a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $10,000, or one year in prison, or both.
4. 521 F.2d at 1191 n.3.
5. Id.
6. Scott also claimed that
• . . the agent interfered with his defense by burglarizing his trial headquarters,
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the district court denied Scott's motion without even holding an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine their substance. Scott appealed this decision
primarily on the ground that, in penetrating his defense councils by
means of an undercover agent, the government had infringed upon his
sixth amendment rights.7
attempting to influence the jury by riding on the elevator at the court house
with them and making prejudicial remarks about Scott, engaging in electronic
surveillance, making a bomb threat on the court house to adversely influence
the jury, and lying to and misleading Scott to his detriment. Id. at 1190.
However, no affidavits were filed in support of these allegations. Id.
The penetration of Scott's defense councils by the undercover agent should be
considered an intentional intrusion for purposes of determining whether Scott was
entitled to an automatic reversal of his conviction. See notes 52-60 infra and accompany-
ing text. The agent was deliberately placed inside Scott's defense camp by the IRS, with
full knowledge of the prosecution. Id. Although he was instructed not to interfere with
the defense effort, on at least one occasion the agent passed information to the
prosecution relating to alleged defense tampering with trial exhibits. Judge Browning, in
his dissenting opinion, suggested that this finding in itself lent "some credibility to the
contention that [the agent] may have also communicated information relevant to
appellant's legitimate defense." Id. at 1200 n.11. Even if such information was not
communicated, however, the very presence of a deliberately placed government agent
inside the defense camp created a "very real likelihood of prejudice." United States v.
Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 977 (3d Cir. 1972). See Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349
F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), holding that police department was responsible for
the activities of police undercover agents, even if such activities violated departmental
regulations. Cf. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-75 (1958) (government
could not disown informer on basis that it was ignorant of his activities).
7. Scott also invoked the protection of the fourth and fifth amendments before the
court of appeals. The court correctly noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (Hoffa 1), was dispositive of the defendant's fourth
amendment claim. 521 F.2d at 1190-91. In Hoffa I, which involved a factual situation
similar to Scott, see notes 26-32 infra and accompanying text, the Supreme Court held
that there had been no invasion of any interests legitimately protected by the fourth
amendment. The Court said that the defendant had effectively waived any fourth
amendment privilege since every word that the informer heard "was either directed to
him or knowingly carried on in his presence." 385 U.S. at 302. The defendant's consent
was not vitiated because the informer had failed to disclose his true identity as a
government informer, since
the risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer
or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably in-
herent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily
assume whenever we speak. Id. at 303, quoting Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan).
The Court in Hoffa I thus made it clear that the fourth amendment does not protect a
defendant's misplaced belief that a person in whom he confides will not reveal informa-
tion communicated to him. Accord, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
As to Scott's claim under the fifth amendment, both the dissenting opinion by Judge
Browning, and the Scott majority opinion recognized that a governmental intrusion which
was not sufficient to bring the sixth amendment into play could be a denial of a fair trial
as guaranteed by the fifth amendment due process clause. The analysis to be used in such
a case is nearly identical to the analysis used to determine if the sixth amendment has
been violated; however, under the fifth amendment as applied by the Scott majority, the
defendant must show actual prejudice. The outcome of Scott therefore depended upon the
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The sixth amendment' right to counsel has been declared "funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial."9 A defendant has a constitutional
right to retain counsel of his own choosing, 10 and must be given a
reasonable length of time to secure satisfactory representation." If a
criminal defendant cannot afford an attorney, one must be provided for
him in all felony cases12 and in any other case where he is faced with the
possibility of imprisonment.' 3 Counsel, whether retained or appointed,
must provide a defendant with "effective assistance," not merely per-
functory representation.' 4 Therefore, a court must give defense counsel.
sufficient time to prepare his case and to consult with his client.' 5
While he is entitled to effective representation, a criminal defend-
ant is not required to accept the assistance of counsel. In Faretta v.
California,'0 the Supreme Court recently made it clear that a defendant
may elect to defend himself as a matter of constitutional right. The
Court noted that
[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall
be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right
to make his defense.... Although not stated.. . in so many words,
the right to self-representation-to make one's own defense person-
ally-is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.' 7
Thus, the sixth amendment provides a criminal defendant with two
correlative and equal rights: a right to the effective assistance of counsel
and a right to defend pro se.18
court's interpretation of the sixth amendment issue, and the dissenting judge's differing
interpretation.
8. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). There is some indication that a
defendant may be allowed to choose a laymen (i.e., a non-lawyer) as his counsel. Al-
though a defendant appears to have no constitutional right to be represented by a lay-
man, see United States v. Cooper, 493 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 859
(1974); United States v. Stockheimer, 385 F. Supp. 979, 983 (W.D. Wis. 1974);
Hickock v. Hand, 190 Kan. 224, 373 P.2d 206 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 924 (1963),
at least one court has held that the judge may in his discretion allow a defendant who
so desires to be represented by a layman instead of an attorney. See United States v.
Stockheimer, 385 F. Supp. 979, 985 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
11. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).
13. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
14. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15. Id. at 53, 59.
16. 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
17. Id. at 2533.
18. Id. As interpreted by the Court, the constitutional provision guaranteeing the
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As a part of its guarantee of effective representation, the sixth
amendment protects a criminal defendant from surreptitious govern-
mental intrusions into his defense councils. The District of Columbia
Circuit considered the problem of deliberate intrusions into the attorney-
client relationship in Coplon v. United States'9 and Caldwell v. United
States.20 Judith Coplon had been convicted for copying and removing
documents from the Department of Justice where she was employed.
Following her conviction she moved for a new trial on the grounds that
her telephone had been tapped by the FBI throughout her trial, and that
protected communications with her attorney had been intercepted as a
result. Her motion was denied by the trial court without a hearing, and
she appealed. The court of appeals stated: "It is well settled that an
accused does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel if he is denied the
right of private consultation with him.'' On this basis the court con-
cluded that intentional governmental interference with a defendants
right to counsel invalidates the trial during which such interference has
occurred,22 and requires any resulting conviction to be set aside, regard-
less of whether prejudice has been shown.23 The case was therefore
remanded for an evidentiary hearing, with instructions that a new trial
defendant the assistance of counsel merely supplements his basic right to conduct his
own defense.
19. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
20. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
21. 191 F.2d at 757. It seems obvious that a defendant must be able to speak
honestly and openly with his attorney in order to prepare an effective defense. He may
not feel free to do this if he fears that government representatives are listening in on his
conferences. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of protec-
tions extending beyond lawyer-client conversations.
22. However, while that trial is invalidated, the defendant can subsequently be
retried. This has been called the "trial-bar" rule by some commentators. See Note,
Government Interception of Attorney-Client Communications, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 87, 90
(1974).
23. This doctrine requiring automatic reversal without the need to show prejudice is
referred to as the "per se rule." The justification for the rule is that "[tihe right to have
the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). See also United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 974 (3d
Cir. 1972). It also has been described as a "salutory, prophylactic rule [since it] relieves
the defendant of a practically impossible burden of proving that the unconstitutional
conduct worked actual harm to him. A rule or constitutional principle is useless if the
burden of proof necessary to vindicate it is so heavy as to preclude its being effective."
United States ex rel. Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion
of Judge Frank), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 968 (1955). See also United States v. Gartner,
518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975) (justifying the per se rule on the basis of its deter-
rent effect); Note, supra note 22 (advocating even stricter sanctions against the govern-
ment for sixth amendment intrusions than the courts now impose).
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be ordered in the event that Coplon's wiretap allegations were substanti-
ated.
In CaIdwell, the District of Columbia Circuit was again presented
with an intentional intrusion into defense councils, this time through the
use of an undercover agent, hired to find out who was "behind" the
defendant's alleged offenses. The agent won the confidence of the
defendant and his lawyer, and eventually joined the defense team as an
investigator. In this capacity, he had "free access to the planning of the
defense. ' 24 The prosecutor was fully aware of the agent's dual role, and
he received frequent reports concerning defense preparation for the
impending trial. The Caldwell court saw no reason to differentiate this
type of penetration from the wiretaps which had been condemned in
Coplon. Regardless of the means of intrusion, the court held that where
such intrusion is deliberate, a defendant is entitled to a new trial without
the need to show actual prejudice.25
The Supreme Court apparently placed its imprimatur on the Co-
plon and Caldwell decisions in Hoffa v. United States (Ho fa I).216
James Hoffa was originally tried in 1962 for violations of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act, but the trial resulted in a hung jury. Subsequently, in 1964,
Hoffa and three co-defendants were brought to trial on charges of at-
tempting to bribe jurors during the 1962 proceeding. At this second
trial an informer who had been planted by the government testified to
various incriminatory remarks made by Hoffa in 1962 out of the pres-
ence of counsel. The Court held that this testimony had been properly
admitted on the grounds that the incriminatory remarks in question had
not been related to any legitimate defense effort in the first trial.2 7 In
reaching this assessment, however, the Court noted that the informer
had also been involved in 1.962 in several legitimate defense strategy
conferences between Hoffa and his attorneys.28 The Court suggested,
while declining to expressly hold, that if the 1962 trial had resulted
24. 205 F.2d at 880.
25. Id. at 881. As opposed to Coplon, where the district court ruled solely on the
basis of opposing affidavits, the ditrict court in Caldwell had already established in an
evidentiary hearing that an undercover agent had penetrated the defense effort. The court
of appeals therefore reversed Caldwell's conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial. Id. The court also made it clear that an outright acquittal-that is, a reversal of a
defendant's conviction and a dismissal of the charges against him-would be ordered
instead of a new trial only where a defendant shows such actual prejudice as would
render the new trial itself unfair. Id. at 881 n.11.
26. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
27. Id. at 309. In effect, this is an application of the trial-bar rule which had been
announced in Caldwell and Coplon. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
28. Id. at 306.
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in a conviction, the very presence of the informer at these strategy con-
ferences would have required that the conviction be set aside under
the per se rule developed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Cop-
Ion and Caldwell2 9
Hoffa I, as well as Coplon and Caldwell, dealt with intentional
intrusions by the government. The Court extended the sixth amend-
ment's protections to unintentional intrusions in Black v. United
States.3 0 In that case, the FBI had overheard conversations of a defend-
ant and his lawyer through the use of a listening device installed for a
purpose unrelated to the prosecution in question. The Court, in a per
curiam opinion, ruled that a new trial was required in order to "permit
the removal of any doubt as to Black's receiving a fair trial."'" Justices
Harlan and Stewart strenuously dissented. They conceded that the de-
fendant was entitled to a remand for a prejudice hearing, but they did
not believe that the record justified an automatic reversal.3 2 Neverthe-
less, the Court followed Black in the subsequent case of O'Brien v.
United States,3 3 which involved unintentionally overheard conversations
between the defendant and his lawyer, and between the defendant and a
third person. The issue of unintentional intrusion has also arisen in
several lower court cases. These courts have generally followed the
approach advocated by Justices Harlan and Stewart, remanding for a
hearing to determine if a defendant has been prejudiced. 4
As O'Brien suggests, various courts have extended the sixth
amendment beyond attorney-client conferences in order to protect other
communications related to the defense effort. In Hoffa v. United States5
(Hoffa II), the FBI inadvertently overheard a conversation between one
of the defendants and a third party. Since the conversation dealt with
defense preparation for a pending trial, the Court remanded the case for
a hearing to determine whether the intrusion had prejudiced the defend-
ant.36 In United States v. Seale, 7 the Seventh Circuit held that the sixth
29. Id. at 307.
30. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
31. Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 31 (dissenting opinion).
33. 386 U.S. 345 (1967).
34. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Bullook, 441 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1971); Taglianetti
v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (1st Cir. 1968), affd per curiam, 394 U.S. 316
(1969). But see Gradsky v. United States, 376 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 908 (1967).
35. 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
36. Id. at 232-33. The Court stated that it would not apply the per se rule and
reverse the defendant's conviction since "there was apparently no direct intrusion here
Vol. 1975:11641 1169
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amendment protected a conversation between two persons who were
relaying a message to the defendant from his attorney.83 The case was
therefore remanded so the lower court could determine if the intrusion
had proved prejudicial to the defense.3 9
The majority in United States v. Scott40 rejected the defendant's
reliance on these intrusion cases. In the court's view, these cases were
distinguishable on the basis that they dealt with governmental intrusions
into confidential communications between a defendant and his counsel,
whereas no attorney-client relationship was violated in the case before
the court.41 Indeed, the court apparently viewed the decision to appear
pro se as a waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel, and it
concluded that Scott had therefore forfeited any sixth amendment pro-
tection against governmental intrusions into his defense strategy confer-
ences.
4 2
into attorney-client discussions:' Id. at 233. However, the Court directed that a new trial
be held if the district court, on remand, found that the defendant had been hindered in
the preparation of his defense.
37. 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 364.
39. See also United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
876 (1955) (conference between defense lawyer and prospective witness is protected);
United States v. Cooper, 397 F. Supp. 277, 283 (D. Neb. 1975) (conversations between
defendant and non-lawyers working for the defense are protected); United States v. Doe,
364 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
It must be noted that in Hoffa I1 and Seale the interceptions of conversations
relating to defense strategy were not intentionally made. The per se rule of Caldwell and
Coplon is usually applied to intentional government intrusions, while in the case of
unintentional intrusions all that is normally required is a hearing to determine whether
the defendant has been prejudiced. See notes 57-60 infra and accompanying text. It is
therefore unclear whether the courts in Hoffa 1I and Seale declined to order automatic
reversals because the intrusion did not directly violate the attorney-client relationship, or
because the intrusions were unintentional.
40. 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975).
41. Id. at 1191.
42. Id. at 1191-92. Additionally the court stated that even if the sixth amendment
prohibited the penetration of an undercover agent into Scott's defense team, Scott would
have to show that he had been prejudiced by this intrusion in order to gain a new trial.
Id. at 1192. In the opinion of the majority, however, prejudice was impossible since the
nature of Scott's defense was widely publicized and since the evidence against him was
overwhelming. Id. at 1192-95.
Judge Browning responded to this reasoning with the following observations:
Whether or not appellant was guilty of the charge against him, he was en-
titled to be fairly tried and to freely exercise his right to represent himself
without interference or obstruction by the prosecution. The fact that appel-
lant's general line of defense was well known does not mean that his trial
tactics and strategy were foreordained. The agent] allegedly sought to influ-
ence at least one element of that strategy (appellant's decision to take the
stand) in a way that might have affected the outcome. Id. at 1200 (dissenting
opinion).
See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
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Other cases, however, indicate that the sixth amendment's protec-
tion is not confined to communications between lawyer and client, but
extends its guarantee to an "effective" defense. For example, a federal
district court in In re Terkeltoub48 viewed the amendment as ensuring
the privacy of an attorney in all aspects of the preparation of the
defendant's case.
Because privacy is so vital to these preparatory efforts, the prosecution
is forbidden to eavesdrop or plant agents to hear the councils of the
defense .... It makes no difference whether the conversations unlaw-
fully audited are solely between the counsel and client and thus within
the traditional, nonconstitutional privilege. The defendant has a right
to prepare in secret, seeking and inviting those he deems loyal or those
with whom he is willing to risk consultation. The prosecution's secret
intrusion offends both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 44
Thus, the sixth amendment protection should extend to the entire
defense preparation effort, including strategy sessions conducted by
attorneys in the absence of the defendant. 45 When a pro se defendant-
acting as his own attorney-performs these same functions, it follows
that the amendment should also protect his efforts from government
intrusion.
In dissent, Judge Browning took issue with the majority's con-
926 (1952), where the court stated that no matter how overwhelming the evidence, a
conviction cannot stand if the defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel.
43. 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The case involved an application to compel
an attorney to testify before a grand jury concerning conversations he had with a
potential witness in the presence of his client.
44. Id. at 685 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876 (1955) (defendant's lawyer must be free to interview
witnesses without intrusion by government); Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879
(D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955) (government placement of agent as
friend and assistant to defendant violated sixth amendment right to effective counsel).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), lends further support for the position that
sixth amendment protections extend beyond attorney-client discussions. Although
Hickman involved an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with
discovery, the court noted the significance of protecting the privacy of the persons
preparing the case.
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his
client. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion
by opposing parties and counsel. Id. at 510-11.
If, as both Hickman and Terkeltoub indicate, the purpose of protecting the privacy
of trial preparation is to allow an effective presentation of a case, the policy would be
equally applicable to all cases, whether the party is proceeding with counsel or pro se.
45. See Note, Government Interception of Attorney-Client Communications, 49
N.Y.U.L. Ray. 87, 90 (1974).
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clusion that the sixth amendment was inapplicable, as well as with its
position that a showing of prejudice was required. He accused the
majority of "neglect[ing] the fact that the-accused in a criminal case has
a constitutional right to defend himself that is equal in dignity to his
constitutional right to counsel."' The sixth amendment, he concluded,
fully protects the conferences of a pro se defendant and his lay advisers
from governmental intrusions.4r
As indicated, the Ninth Circuit apparently treated Scott's waiver of
the right to counsel as a waiver of all sixth amendment protections.
However, Faretta v. California 4 appears to support Judge Browning's
position that the sixth amendment is equally applicable to the pro se
defendant. In Faretta, the Court stated that the colonists and Framers
never
imagined that this right [of self-representation] might be considered
inferior to the right of assistance of counsel. To the contrary, the colo-
nists and the Framers, as well as their English ancestors, always con-
ceived of the right to counsel as an "assistance" for the accused, to be
used at his option, in defending himself.49
Yet the Scott majority seemingly considered the sixth amendment option
to appear pro se as a right inferior to the sixth amendment guarantee of
effective counsel, for the majority implied that where a government
agent intrudes into strategy conferences between a defendant and his
attorney, it would reverse any resulting conviction.50 Thus, the Scott
46. 521 F.2d at 1198 (dissenting opinion).
47. Id. at 1198-99.
48. 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). Faretta made it clear that a defendant has a constitution-
al right to represent himself. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text. The case was
pending before the Court when Scott was decided. However, as Judge Browning pointed
out, the Ninth Circuit has long recognized a sixth amendment right to defend pro se.
521 F.2d at 1198 (dissenting opinion). See United States v. Dulanovic, 486 F.2d 182
(9th Cir. 1973); Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Price,
474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971); Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th
Cir. 1969) (en bane); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).
It is true that the Ninth Circuit occasionally referred to pro se representation as a
"waiver" of the right to counsel. See United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.
1973); Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969) (en banc). However,
these cases did not suggest that a pro se defendant has waived his sixth amendment
protections. Rather, the Ninth Circuit was simply recognizing that since -the right to
counsel and the correlative sixth amendment right to defend oneself cannot both be
exercised at the same time, the defendant must "waive" his right to counsel before his
sixth amendment right to appear pro se can be exercised. See United States v. Dujanovic,
486 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
49. 95 S. Ct. at 2539 (emphasis added).
50. 521 F.2d at 1193; cf. In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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court made it more "expensive" for a pro se defendant to confer with lay
advisors than for a defendant who had retained counsel to confer with
his attorney. This result is particularly difficult to accept in light of the
Supreme Court's well-established position that a criminal defendant
should not be deterred from exercising his constitutional rights, and that
it is "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surren-
dered in order to assert another."5'
Though the precedents indicate that the sixth amendment does
protect a pro se defendant from governmental intrusion, and that the
result reached in Scott is constitutionally unacceptable, the question of
an appropriate remedy still remains. In most intrusion cases, courts
either have remanded for a hearing to determine whether a defendant
was actually prejudiced by the alleged intrusion,52 or have applied a per
se rule requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction, with leave to
the government to re-prosecute the case.5 3 When the problem of gov-
ernmental intrusion into defense councils first arose in the Caldwell and
Coplon cases, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a "per se" rule
requiring reversal without regard to whether a defendant had been
prejudiced. 54 The Supreme Court seemed to endorse this approach in
See generally Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); United States v. Gartner,
518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418,
424-25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); South Dakota v. Long, 465
F.2d 65, 72 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973); United States v.
Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1970); Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 926 (1952).
51. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). In Simmons, the Court
held that a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth
amendment grounds could not be used against him at trial. The Court was of the opinion
that without this, rule, the defendant would be placed in the dilemma of either giving up
what he believed to be a valid fourth amendment claim, or of waiving his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
52. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231, 233 (1967); United States v.
Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1972); Manuel v. Salisbury, 446 F.2d 453, 456-
57 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); United States v. Zarzour, 432
F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1970); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (1st Cir.
1968), aff'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 316 (1969).
53. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 307 (1966); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966); Gradsky v.
United States, 376 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 908 (1967); Caldwell v.
United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749,
759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952); cf. United States v. Rispo,
460 F.2d 965, 975-77 (3d Cir. 1972).
54. See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
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Hoffa I.5 Nevertheless, the majority in Scott concluded that most courts
have "refused to apply a per se rule."'5 Yet the cases cited by the
majority do not support this conclusion. On the contrary, these cases
have correctly noted that the per se rule should be applied in cases
wherever, as in Caldwell and Coplon, there has been an intentional sur-
reptitious invasion of the defense camp-where "government intrusion
of the grossest kind" is evident.5 7 Where, however, a defendant has not
shown an impermissible intrusion into the councils of the defense,m or
where the intrusion was unintentional,59 a conviction will not be re-
55. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
56. 521 F.2d at 1192.
57. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 306 (1966); cf. In re Terkeltoub, 256 F.
Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227-28 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 424-25 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65, 72 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973); United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965,
975-77 (3d Cir. 1972); Manuel v. Salisbury, 446 F.2d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876 (1955);
Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Coplon v. United States, 191
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952); United States v. Cooper,
397 F. Supp. 277, 285 (D. Neb. 1975).
The penetration by the IRS into Scott's defense councils was deliberate, see note 6
supra, and arguably should therefore fall into this category of "gross" intrusions.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227-28 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974) (co-defendant who had agreed to "cooperate" with
prosecution nevertheless refused to inform on Rosner); United States v. Zarzour, 432
F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1970) (private investigator hired by defendant's lawyer was also a
paid confidential FBI informer on unrelated matters, and he remained completely loyal
to defense throughout trial); United States v. Alderisio, 424 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1970)
(no attorney-client relationship existed at time of overheard conversations between
defendant and third person who was an attorney, but who was not then representing
defendant); United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 535 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
876 (1955) (informer present at conference attended by defendant's attorney at which
the only pertinent matter discussed was fund-raising for the defense). See also United
States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1975); Manuel v. Salisbury, 446 F.2d 453 (6th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); United States v. Andreadis, 234 F. Supp.
341 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974) (conversation between defendant and counsel was over-
heard in course of unrelated electronic surveillance, but defendant did not allege that
conversation was related to trial in question); United States v. Bullock, 441 F.2d 59 (5th
Cir. 1971); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (1st Cir. 1968), affd per
curiam, 394 U.S. 316 (1969) (same fact pattern as Brown; additionally, information
from the surveillance was not transmitted to prosecution). But see O'Brien v. United
States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966); Gradsky v.
United States, 376 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 908 (1967).
A line of unintentional intrusion cases has developed in the Second Circuit govern-
ing situations where there are two or more defendants, and one of them agrees to
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versed automatically. Instead, a court will generally remand such a case
for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has been prejudiced
by the intrusion." Thus, the court in Scott should, at the very least,
have remanded the case for such a hearing.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the sixth amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant both the assistance of counsel and the
right to appear pro se. In light of these two correlative and equal rights,
this Recent Development has taken the position that sixth amendment
protections should be applied so as to enable any defendant to make an
"effective" defense. Since no defendant can present an effective defense
if the prosecution is permitted to intrude into his defense councils, the
sixth amendment must protect the pro se defendant, as well as the
defendant who is represented by counsel, against such intrusions. When
the government intrudes into the defense councils of any defendant,
then depending upon whether the intrusion was intentional, the de-
fendant should be given either a new trial or a remand to determine
if he has been prejudiced.
"cooperate" with the prosecution but refuses to reveal defense trial strategy. Where the
facts of a particular case have been clearly established by the district court, the Second
Circuit has been willing to make its own finding that the defendant was not prejudiced.
United States v. Arroyo, 494 F.2d 1316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974);
United States v. Mosca, 475 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 948 (1973);
Klein v. Smith, 383 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Cohen, 358 F.
Supp. 112, 127-29 (S.D.N.Y.), arfd, 485 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1973); cf. South Dakota
v. Long, 465 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973). But see
United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1972) (co-defendant had been a paid gov-
ernment informer throughout entire trial):
Whether or not the intrusion by the Government here can be characterized as
'gross' is a matter of degree, and this court will not be bound by such con-
siderations where the probability of unfairness due to the Government's
misconduct is incapable of realistic delineation. Id. at 976.
Declining to apply a rigid per se rule, 'the Third Circuit nevertheless ordered a new trial
because it considered the likelihood of prejudice so great that its elimination from the
trial was required in order to satisfy the demands of due process. Id. at 977.
60. See cases cited in notes 58-59 supra.
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